Ireland Moves to Reform Defamation Laws with the Introduction of the Defamation (Amendment) Bill 2024

The Irish Government has recently approved the publication of the Defamation (Amendment) Bill 2024, marking a significant step toward overhauling the country’s defamation laws. The proposed reforms emerge from a statutory review of the existing legislation, the Defamation Act 2009. This initiative comes as part of the Justice Plan 2024, which aims to modernise the legal landscape surrounding defamation in Ireland.

Key Provisions of the Bill

The Bill, expected to be introduced to the Irish Parliament by Autumn 2024, incorporates several major reforms.

Abolition of Juries:

Among the most notable of reforms is the abolition of juries in High Court defamation cases, a move that the Minister for Justice Helen McEntee says will “reduce the likelihood of disproportionate awards of damages, significantly reduce delays and legal costs, and reduce the duration of Court hearings”. The abolition of juries is expected to result in more predictable and uniform results and awards in defamation cases.

Promotion of Alternative Dispute Resolution:

The proposed legislation will encourage the use of alternative dispute resolution (ADR), as well as correction and apology for genuine errors. The Bill provides reforms to current procedures and ‘offers of amends’.  In evaluating costs for defamation cases, Courts will now factor in the conduct of the parties after an offer of amends is made and consider any unjustified refusal by the parties to participate in ADR.

Protection against Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation:

The proposed legislation also addresses the growing concern over Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs). SLAPPS are unfounded lawsuits, often initiated with the intent of silencing public debate or investigation on issues of public concern. Under the new Bill, Courts will be empowered to take stronger actions against SLAPPs, including the publication of Circuit Court judgments on the Courts Service website where proceedings have been found to amount to a SLAPP.

Protection for Broadcasters and Retail Businesses:

The Bill provides a new defence for broadcasters against liability for defamatory statements made during live broadcasts, on the condition that reasonable precautions were taken to prevent such occurrences. Furthermore, retail businesses will benefit from a statutory defence in cases of alleged verbal defamation, which often involve accusations of shoplifting. The defence is designed to protect retailers from the rising tide of defamation claims that generate significant legal and insurance costs.

Conclusion

The Defamation (Amendment) Bill 2024 represents a significant overhaul of Ireland’s defamation laws, with the potential to streamline legal proceedings, reduce costs, and protect public interest journalism. While some opposition remains, particularly regarding the abolition of juries, the government is pushing forward with these reforms as a necessary evolution in the face of modern challenges to freedom of expression and the protection of individual reputations.

 

Government Publishes Bill to Modernise Mental Health Legislation

The Government has published the Mental Health Bill 2024, which was approved last week. This new Bill, set to replace the Mental Health Acts 2001-2022, comprises 202 sections and introduces significant reforms, including the regulation of all community Child and Adolescent Mental Health Services (CAMHS) for the first time.

Mary Butler, the Minister responsible for mental health and older people, announced that the Bill is prepared for introduction to the Oireachtas “as soon as possible” when the Dáil reconvenes in September. She described the Bill as “lengthy and complex” and highlighted its focus on a “more modern, person-centred approach to mental-health legislation.”

New Criteria for Admission

Key reforms in the Bill include:

– Updated Involuntary Admission and Detention Process: The Bill introduces revised criteria for the admission and detention of individuals with severe mental-health difficulties.

– Overhauled Consent to Treatment: There is a reformed approach to obtaining consent for treatment from those involuntarily admitted.

– Expanded Regulatory Function: The Mental Health Commission’s oversight will now extend to all community mental-health residences and services, including all community CAMHS.

– Alignment with Assisted Decision-Making Acts: The Bill aligns more closely with the principles outlined in the Assisted Decision-Making (Capacity) Acts 2015 and 2022.

– Provisions for 16 and 17-Year-Olds: A new section allows 16 and 17-year-olds to consent to or refuse mental-health treatment.

These changes aim to modernise Ireland’s mental-health legislation, making it more inclusive, person-centred, and aligned with contemporary principles of patient autonomy and consent

Unless Orders and their potential impact on insurers and brokers

Unless Orders have been in operation now since being formally introduced by Statutory Instrument 490 of 2021, which was commenced on 13th November 2021.  This Statutory Instrument amended the Rules of the Superior Courts with the intention of expediting proceedings and limiting the number of Motions, and the repetition of Motions, in the Court lists where parties would be seeking orders for judgment in in default of appearance/defence or to strike out an action for want of prosecution for failure to deliver a statement of claim.  The process is applicable to both Plaintiffs and Defendants and the Orders made set out strict time limits for delivery and filing of such documents.

Where a party was not able to comply with the Order, or failed to do so, and had their case dismissed or judgment in default was obtained Order 27 Rule 15 provides the following:

“(1) Any order dismissing the plaintiff’s action for want of prosecution, whether under this Order or any other Order of these Rules, may be set aside by the Court upon such terms as to costs or otherwise as the Court may think fit, if the Court is satisfied that at the time of the failure special circumstances (to be recited in the order) existed which explain and justify the failure.

(2) Any judgment by default, whether under this Order or any other Order of these Rules, may be set aside by the Court upon such terms as to costs or otherwise as the Court may think fit, if the Court is satisfied that at the time of the default special circumstances (to be recited in the order) existed which explain and justify the failure, and where an action has been set down under rule 9, such setting down may be dealt with by the Court in the same way as if a judgment by default had been signed when the case was set down.“

SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES

The reliance upon special circumstances was discussed in the judgement of Mr Justice Ferriter in   Da Souza -v- Liffey Meats [2023 IEHC 402] dated 11th July 2023 . In this case, the Defence solicitor had been taking instructions from his client, had raised further and better particulars, was in the course of obtaining an expert report, and had written to the Plaintiff’s solicitor to express some surprise that a motion had been issued for judgment in default defence where there had been on delay to that point. On consent an unless Order was obtained allowing a period of 10 weeks for the delivery of the Defence.  Critically, the Defence solicitor was not aware that the Order made was an “unless order”. To compound matters, the barrister instructed to draft the Defence had personal difficulties of a tragic nature. The Court considered whether ”special circumstances” existed which would explain and justify the failure, but also questioned whether “special circumstances” under the rule is to be treated not just at the date the Court made the order, but also at the date of the judgment by default. This was an approach adopted by a majority in the Supreme Court in McGuinn v. Commissioner of An Garda Síochána [2011] IESC 33. Judge Ferriter took the view that Supreme Court case supported the view he had taken in this case that the question of special circumstances arose, on the facts of this case, at the date of the judgment by default.

The Judge stated, “a more demanding set of reasons or circumstances is required than under the old regime, as part of a general tightening of approach to compliance with deadlines and expedition of litigation in light of the constitutional and Convention imperatives of ensuring that justice is administered efficiently and expeditiously.” He went on to note that “the general point remains that to treat a mistake or inadvertence by a solicitor as to the period ordered by a court for delivering a defence, failing which judgment will follow, would risk undermining the rationale for the rule being that of ensuring greater compliance with deadlines and court orders and ending the old culture of lax approaches to court-imposed deadlines and indulgence of disregard for court orders on procedural matters…. generally speaking, a solicitor mistake or inadvertence as to the terms or existence of an order for judgment in default (including an unless order) will not amount to special circumstances within the meaning of the rule. ”

The Court ultimately did find that the tragic circumstances which befell the Barrister, within the period issue, meant that he was not able to attend to this practice, and therefore explained and justified the default. The fact that the case had been fully defended up to that point, and a Motion to set aside the order had issued quickly indicated that it was also in the interest of justice that the Order be set aside.

RECENT CASE LAW AND COMMENT

In an unreported (and unapproved) Judgment of Ms Justice Brett delivered on the 11th July 2024 we have become aware of, similar matters fell for her consideration where a Plaintiff had obtained judgment in default of appearance against a Defendant. The case concerned an incident at the All Ireland Hurling final in August 2018.   It was noted that the solicitors for the Plaintiff had not only progressed the proceedings on the Plaintiff’s behalf, but also in their warnings to the Defendant in connection with the impending motion, and interacting with who the solicitor believed to have been the Defendant’s insurers/broker at the time. To compound matters the Defendant had changed its registered address and only notified the CRO after the Plenary Summons had issued.  The Defendant was aware of the proceedings and had passed same for the attention of their insurance broker. The Plaintiff’s solicitor continued to engage in correspondence with the Defendant’s insurance broker, and the Plaintiff ultimately obtained an unless order against the Defendant. A copy of the Order with proof of service occurred after the judgment had come into effect. A Motion to set the order aside was issued approximately 8 months after the order was perfected.

The Judge noted that this is a case in which inadvertence of a solicitor was not in issue, but rather an intermediary between the Defendant and a solicitor, and that the failure to nominate solicitors for such service resulted in no Appearance being entered on behalf of the Defendant. She accepted that there was a qualitative difference between a solicitor and others involved in the litigation process, but noted in so far as insurers cannot be said to be unfamiliar with the litigation process, they are not solicitors.  The Judge noted a series of errors had occurred over a period of time; the receipt of the proceedings due to a change of registered address, confusion over which insurer covered the incident, a change in brokers occurring after the incident, and the Defendant’s belief that they had fulfilled their obligations under the policy of insurance by notifying its insurers of the communications received from the Plaintiff’s solicitor.

The Judge found that there were “special circumstances” in that the Defendant had notified its broker but also because the omission to enter an Appearance on behalf of the Defendant was not an omission made by legal advisors. She went on to state that the circumstances of this case included confusion in respect of the precise insurer cover relevant to the date of the Plaintiff’s claim, and a change in both insurance broker and insurer at different times between the incident and the receipt of the proceedings. The Defendant had demonstrated on Affidavit that it had a good defence to the Plaintiff’s claim and in the interests of justice the judgment obtained in default of Appearance should be set aside.

There was of course a cautionary passage in the judgment directed at insurers and insurance brokers, which might become unwittingly involved in the litigation process by not instructing solicitors. While Judge Brett noted the qualitative difference between a solicitor and others, this should not be considered a ‘get out of jail free card’ for insurers or insurance brokers but rather ‘an opportunity to give a timely warning… that proper attention must be given’.

 

Court of Appeal Reduces Damages Award For Not Considering PI Guidelines

COLLINS -V- PARM & ORS | 2022 2006 P

The Court of Appeal has reduced a damages award, finding it “so disproportionate as to amount to an error of law.” Mr. Justice Seamus Noonan criticized the High Court judge for not considering the Personal Injury Guidelines, introduced in 2019 to standardize injury awards.

The High Court judge identified that her dominant injury was psychiatric and that her post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) had upended almost every aspect of her life for many months, although the position has improved. He awarded €55,000 general damages for this and an “uplift” of €40,000 for her other injuries. The Defendants, insured by AXA Insurance, admitted partial liability but argued contributory negligence since Collins was not wearing a seatbelt. The High Court Judge found her 15% responsible for her injuries.

The Defendants appealed the High Court award, arguing it was excessive, inadequately explained and a departure from the 2019 Guidelines.

The original award of €99,162 was cut to €59,162 by the Appeal Court, with a further 15% reduction for contributory negligence, resulting in a final award of €50,287 to Courtney Collins. The Appeal Court noted that the Defendants had not referenced the Guidelines or comparative cases themselves.

Solicitor Attendance at Engineering Inspections

Engineering Inspections are invaluable for Litigation Solicitors like us, providing crucial insights into the causes of accidents. Regardless of whether we represent Plaintiffs or Defendants, these inspections offer a deeper understanding of the case at hand.

In litigation, it is common for Claims Handlers representing defendants to attend such inspections, and rightfully so. Their presence allows for a comprehensive analysis of the accident’s dynamics, revealing both its strengths and weaknesses.

We firmly advocate for a collaborative approach during inspections, rejecting the notion that engineers dictate the proceedings. Solicitors play a pivotal role in directing engineers, ensuring a balanced perspective.

Moreover, attending Engineering Inspections greatly facilitates briefing legal counsel. To effectively instruct counsel, Solicitors must grasp the accident’s mechanics and context fully. By participating in inspections, we can convey explanations in a manner accessible to legal professionals, free from technical jargon.

Historically, objections to Solicitors attending inspections were rare. However, recent trends have seen defendants attempting to prevent Solicitor involvement.

A notable case illustrating this was the recent case of Murphy v. Stryker, the defendant initially resisted the presence of a Solicitor during inspection. However, after arguments were presented, Mr. Justice Coffey of the High Court ruled in favour of granting inspection facilities to both the engineer and the Solicitor, recognizing the importance of their roles.

We trust that this decision has effectively resolved the issue, affirming the right for Solicitors to participate in Engineering Inspections.